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FREE EXPRESSION AND EDUCATION:
BETWEEN TWO DEMOCRACIES
Stephen M. Feldman*
Political scientist Benjamin R. Barber has written: "[I]n democracies, education
is the indispensable concomitant of citizenship."' If true-if education is integrally
tied to democracy-then the definition of democracy would necessarily shape the
purpose of education. And since democracy is also linked with free expression, then
the scope of students' free-expression rights might vary in accordance with the
purpose of education vis-A-vis democracy.
During the course of its history, the United States has operated under two
fundamentally different forms of democracy. From the constitutional framing
through the 1920s, Americans conceptualized the national and state governments as
republican democracies.2 Under republican democratic governments, virtuous
citizens and officials ostensibly pursued the common good. An alleged lack of civic
virtue--entwined with an apparent failure to accept certain traditional American
values-could preclude one from participating in democratic processes. Throughout
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, crusaders for virtue-often brooding
about the habits and values of immigrants and their children-would insist that
citizens exhibit values such as temperance, frugality, and industriousness.
Frequently, on this ground, old-stock, white, Protestant Americans supposedly
justified excluding from the polity African-Americans, Irish-Catholic immigrants,
and other peripheral groups.3
In the republican democratic regime, courts reviewed governmental actions to
ensure that they promoted the common good rather than partial or private interests.
* Jerry W. Housel/Carl F. Arnold Distinguished Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor
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Consistent with this general practice of republican democratic judicial review, courts
delineated the scope of free expression pursuant to a bad tendency test. The
government could not impose prior restraints on expression, but it could impose
criminal penalties for speech or writing that had bad tendencies or likely harmful
consequences. Expression with bad tendencies supposedly contravened the common
good, so courts, remaining consistent with republican democratic principles, readily
upheld numerous restrictions on expression.4
The primary purpose of education within the republican democratic regime was
to inculcate children with the values necessary to become virtuous citizens who
would pursue the common good.5 In Meyer v. Nebraska, decided in 1923, the Supreme
Court held that a law proscribing the teaching of languages other than English
before the ninth grade was an arbitrary and therefore unconstitutional exercise of the
police power. The Court underscored the importance of teachers to the promotion
of the common good: "Practically, education of the young is only possible in schools
conducted by especially qualified persons who devote themselves thereto. The calling
always has been regarded as useful and honorable, essential, indeed, to the public
welfare. '' 7 In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, decided two years later, the Court elaborated
on the powers of the government in the realm of education.' "No question is raised
concerning the power of the State reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect,
supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils," wrote Justice James C.
McReynolds for a unanimous Court.9 The state can "require that all children of proper
age attend some school, that teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic
disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught,
and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare."'
Succumbing to the pressures of industrialization, immigration, and urbanization,
republican democracy crumbled in the late 1920s to mid-1930s, and a new
democracy arose. Under this pluralist democracy, one did not need to demonstrate
civic virtue to qualify as a participant. During the thirties, many ethnic and
immigrant urbanites who had previously been discouraged from partaking in
' E.g., Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273 (1915) (applying the bad tendency test to
uphold conviction); Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Attorney General, 205 U.S. 454 (1907)
(upholding contempt of court conviction). For a discussion of free expression under
republican democracy, see Stephen M. Feldman, Free Speech, World Warl, and Republican
Democracy: The Internal and External Holmes, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 192 (2008).
' JUDITH RI'NYI, GOING PUBLIC: SCHOOLING FOR A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 26 (1993)
(describing the common school movement of the mid-nineteenth century as intended to
impose a Protestant religious and cultural outlook on immigrants).
6 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
I d. at 400.
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
9 Id. at 534.
10 Id.
1000 [Vol. 16:999
FREE EXPRESSION AND EDUCATION
national politics became voters and actively cast their support for the New Deal.
Moreover, pluralist democracy acknowledged that politics was about the pursuit of
self-interest. Interest group efforts to satisfy preexisting desires became normal and
legitimate. Governmental goals could no longer be condemned as contravening the
common good; all such substantive goals were determined through interest group
bargaining and coalition building. Ultimately, then, pluralist democracy was defined
through processes that ensured full and fair participation, the assertion of one's
interests and desires, especially in the legislative arena."
In 1937 and following years, the Court accepted the structures of pluralist
democracy, and in doing so, the Justices rendered judicial review problematic.
Previously, courts had used their power to enforce basic republican democratic
principles: upholding governmental actions that promoted the common good and
invalidating actions that furthered partial or private interests. With the repudiation
of republican democracy, the purpose of judicial review became obscure, but over
time, the Supreme Court developed new doctrines to implement its power. More than
anything, the Court policed the processes of pluralist democracy, supposedly assuring
that participation remained fair and open.'2 In the free-expression context, the change
began with Herndon v. Lowry. 13 The Court reversed Georgia's conviction of Angelo
Herndon, a black Communist Party organizer who had attempted to persuade other
individuals, mostly African-Americans, to join the Party. 4 Justice Owen Roberts's
confusing majority opinion rested on multiple grounds, yet it nonetheless marked a
significant doctrinal turn. Roberts repudiated the bad tendency test while also
creating a presumption favoring the protection of expression. 5 Subsequently, in a
phenomenal string of cases from 1938 to 1940, the Court upheld one free expression
claim after another. 16 While the Court, of course, did not continue to uphold every
free expression claim, most scholars and jurists would agree that, in the regime of
pluralist democracy, free expression became a constitutional "lodestar.' ' 7
Just as the transition from republican to pluralist democracy helped transform
free expression, the transition to pluralist democracy also altered the primary
" On the transition from republican to pluralist democracy, see Stephen M. Feldman, The
Theory and Politics of First Amendment Protections: Why Does the Supreme Court Favor
Free Expression over Religious Freedom?, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 433-43 (2006).
12 JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
13 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
14 id.
'5 Id.
6 See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (holding that labor picketing is
protected free speech); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (invalidating conviction for
distributing handbills); Hague v. Comm. Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (upholding right
of unions to organize in streets).
'7 G. Edward White, The FirstAmendment Comes ofAge: The Emergence of Free Speech
in Twentieth-Century America, 95 MICH. L. REv. 299, 300-01 (1996).
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purpose of education. No longer were teachers to inculcate students with the values
integral to republican democratic civic virtue. Now, it seemed, children had to be
taught the skills needed to participate in democratic processes. Children needed to
learn to read, to write, to communicate orally, and to reason analytically. In West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, decided during the nation's World
War H battle against totalitarian governments, the Court held that compulsory flag
salutes in the public schools violated free expression.' 8 Consistent with pluralist
democracy, the Court celebrated "the rich cultural diversities" in American society
and stressed that governments cannot coerce patriotism, national unity, or orthodoxy
in values, even in young school children. 9 In Brown v. Board of Education, decided
in 1954, the Court held that separate-but-equal public schooling violated equal
protection.20 "Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments," emphasized Chief Justice Earl Warren's unanimous opinion.2'
"Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both
demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic
society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities,
even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. 22
Yet recent Supreme Court cases adjudicating free expression issues in edu-
cational contexts are anomalous. Instead of adhering to the strictures of pluralist
democracy, as other free expression cases have done, education cases have oscillated
between republican and pluralist democracies. This Article argues that, under the
pluralist democratic regime, the role of education has remained contested and
ambiguous-in both secondary and higher education-and that this ambiguity has
in part engendered the Court's ambivalence.
Part I of this Article discusses Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District and its progeny.23 Tinker, decided in 1969, articulated broad free
expression rights for public school students, but subsequent cases retreated from that
strong First Amendment position.24 Part I analyzes how the Court's sundry
viewpoints manifested opposed conceptions of education corresponding with
republican and pluralist democracies. Part 11 focuses on Morse v. Frederick, holding
that a public school did not violate the First Amendment when it punished a student
for displaying a banner proclaiming, "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS. '25 The Justices'
various opinions in Morse epitomize the complex interrelations among education,
democracy, and free expression.
Is 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
'9 Id. at 640-42.
20 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
21 Id. at 493.
22 Id.
23 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
24 Id.
25 127 S.Ct. 2618, 2622 (2007).
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I. FREE EXPRESSION, EDUCATION, AND DEMOCRACY
A. Education as Training for Pluralist Democratic Participation
Tinker arose when a high school and a junior high school suspended students
for wearing black armbands in protest against the Vietnam War.26 Writing for a
seven-Justice majority, Justice Abe Fortas began by categorizing the armbands as
"pure speech" rather than conduct and, therefore, deserving of "comprehensive
protection under the First Amendment. 2 7 Fortas emphasized that "[ilt can hardly
be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom
of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. ''28 Fortas acknowledged that the
school environment might diminish the scope of First Amendment rights, so he
articulated a doctrinal rule specific for educational institutions. Even so, beginning
with a presumption of constitutional protection, the Court adopted a highly speech-
protective doctrine: student expression would be constitutionally protected unless
it caused "material and substantial interference with schoolwork or discipline., 29 In
this case, the evidence did not show "that the school authorities had reason to
anticipate that the wearing of the armbands would substantially interfere with the
work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other students."3 To the contrary,
the officials appeared to want merely to avoid a political controversy.3'
The Court stressed that free expression in the public schools was especially
important to American constitutional government. Quoting Justice William Brennan,
Fortas wrote: "The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more
vital than in the community of American schools. 32 Why so? Because public
schools provide the training grounds where students learn the skills prerequisite for
participation in pluralist democracy-the skills needed to become citizens and
leaders. "The classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' The Nation's
future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange
of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through
any kind of authoritative selection. '"33 In pluralist democracy, citizens need to be
able to reason, to negotiate, to compromise, and to accept (or at least tolerate) a
multitude (or plurality) of values-in short, they need to communicate with diverse
other citizens-and schools are "dedicated" to teaching, among other things,
26 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
27 Id. at 505-06.
28 Id. at 506.
29 Id. at 511.
30 Id. at 509.
" Id. at510--ll.
32 Id. at 512 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960)).
33 Id.
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"personal intercommunication. '  In sum, Tinker was a prototypical pluralist
democratic free expression decision. The Court not only interpreted the First
Amendment broadly, but it also seemed oblivious to the considerations of virtue,
values, and civility that had loomed prominently under republican democracy.35
Instead, Fortas emphasized:
[un our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of
disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of
expression. Any departure from absolute regimentation may
cause trouble. Any variation from the majority's opinion may
inspire fear. Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on
the campus, that deviates from the views of another person may
start an argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution
says we must take this risk, and our history says that it is this
sort of hazardous freedom-this kind of openness-that is the
basis of our national strength and of the independence and vigor
of Americans who grow up and live in this relatively permissive,
often disputatious, society.36
While Tinker involved high school and junior high students, Healy v. James
involved college students.37 A state college refused to accord "official recognition"
to students who sought to form a chapter of Students for a Democratic Society
(SDS), an organization renowned for its protests against the Vietnam War.38
"Denial of official recognition posed serious problems for the organization's
existence and growth," the Court explained.39 The group's "members were deprived
of the opportunity to place announcements regarding meetings, rallies, or other
activities in the student newspaper; they were precluded from using various campus
bulletin boards; and [they were barred] from using campus facilities for holding
meetings."4 Reversing and remanding for further development of the facts, the
Healy Court unequivocally applied Tinker in the college context.4' Justice Lewis
F. Powell, writing for an eight-Justice majority (Justice William H. Rehnquist
concurred in the result only), elaborated the Tinker doctrine-student expression
would be protected unless it "posed a substantial threat of material disruption" 42-by
3 id.
"5 The Tinker Court never mentioned virtue, values, or civility. Id. at 504-14.
36 Id. at 508-09.
17 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
38 Id. at 170-71.
39 Id. at 176.
4 id.
41 Id. at 190-91.
42 Id. at 189.
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linking it to the landmark case Brandenburg v. Ohio.4 3 Like Brandenburg, Healy
pronounced a dichotomy: advocacy versus incitement. In the college context, the
expression of ideas is always constitutionally protected, while expression urging (or
inciting) imminent disruptive conduct is unprotected." Thus, students could advocate
with impunity for changing or eliminating campus rules-including reasonable time,
place, and manner restrictions on expression-but students could neither violate nor
incite imminent violations of those same rules without risking punishment.
45
Once again, like in Tinker, the Healy Court's opinion resonated with pluralist
democracy. "[T]he precedents of this Court leave no room for the view that, because
of the acknowledged need for order, First Amendment protections should apply with
less force on college campuses than in the community at large."' To the contrary,
higher education should epitomize the operations of free expression in a pluralist
democratic society: "The college classroom with its surrounding environs is
peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas,' and we break no new constitutional ground in
reaffirming this Nation's dedication to safeguarding academic freedom."'47 In fact,
under pluralist democracy, political dialogues often seem more like pitched battles
than coldly rational marketplace exchanges, and the Healy Court acknowledged that
incivility could therefore appear "on the campus" as it did elsewhere.48 "[T]he wide
latitude accorded by the Constitution to the freedoms of expression and association
is not without its costs in terms of the risk to the maintenance of civility and an
ordered society. '49 Yet, the Court reasoned, we must abide uncivil speech and
writing and the bitter clashes of opposed political groups if we are to maintain "our
vigorous and free society" and to realize the advantages of pluralist democracy.5"
The Healy Court's embrace of the spirited, conflict-laden nature of pluralist
democracy echoed another Supreme Court decision from nearly a quarter-century
earlier. In Terminiello v. Chicago,5 the Court reasoned:
[A] function of free speech under our system of government is
to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when
it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with
43 395 U.S. 444 (1969). In Brandenburg, the Court held that the First Amendment does
"not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and
is likely to incite or produce such action." Id. at 447.
" Healy, 408 U.S. at 188-89.
41 Id. at 192-94.
46 Id. at 180.
41 Id. at 180-81.
41 Id. at 194.
49 Id,
50 id.
51 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
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conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is
often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices
and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it
presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of
speech, though not absolute, is nevertheless protected against
censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear
and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far
above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest. There is no
room under our Constitution for a more restrictive view. For the
alternative would lead to standardization of ideas either by
legislatures, courts, or dominant political or community groups.52
One year after Healy, the Court followed the same approach in Papish v. Board
of Curators of University of Missouri.53 The case arose when a university expelled
a student for publishing an on-campus (though not university-sponsored) newspaper
that contained allegedly indecent expression. 54 The Court reiterated the Healy
Court's distinction between advocacy and incitement. "We think Healy makes it
clear that the mere dissemination of ideas-no matter how offensive to good
taste--on a state university campus may not be shut off in the name alone of
'conventions of decency."' 55 In a pluralist democratic regime, the government cannot
restrict expression to promote those values or virtues supposedly needed to engender
civil interactions. Chief Justice Warren Burger dissented on this very point: "[A]
university is not merely an arena for the discussion of ideas by students and faculty;
it is also an institution where individuals learn to express themselves in acceptable,
civil terms."56 Indeed, Burger articulated a distinction that hearkened back to the
republican democratic past. Under republican democracy, courts traditionally
distinguished between liberty and license: freedom of expression did not justify an
abuse of expression. Chief Justice Burger wrote: "To preclude a state university or
college from regulating the distribution of such obscene materials does not protect the
values inherent in the First Amendment; rather, it demeans those values. 57
52 Id. at 4-5 (citations omitted).
53 410 U.S. 667 (1973).
54 Id.
55 Id. at 670.
56 Id. at 672 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
5' Id. For examples where judges distinguished liberty from license or freedom from its
abuse, see Cincinnati Gazette Co. v. Timberlake, 10 Ohio St. 548, 555 (1860); Respublica
v. Montgomery, 1 Yeates 419 (Pa. 1795); LEONARD W. LEvY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS
212-13 (1985) (quoting Judge Thomas McKean); JOSEPH STORY, 3 COMMENTARES ON THE
CONSTITUTION §§ 1874-86 (1833), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 182-84
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
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B. Education as Cultivation of Republican Democratic Virtue
By 1986, when the Court decided its next major case involving free expression
in an educational institution, the majority of Justices had swung toward Burger's
outlook. In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, a high school suspended a
student who delivered an allegedly lewd speech at an assembly. 8 Burger's majority
opinion began by acknowledging that Tinker held that students retain First
Amendment rights, but the Court then retreated from the Tinker doctrine. Rather
than protecting student expression unless it caused material and substantial
interference with schoolwork or discipline, the Bethel Court emphasized school
officials' discretion to determine whether expression "would undermine the school's
basic educational mission."' Based on this deferential stance, the Court found the
student's expression unprotected, upheld the punishment, and even quoted Justice
Hugo Black's Tinker dissent, disclaiming "that the Federal Constitution compels the
teachers, parents, and elected school officials to surrender control of the American
public school system to public school students.'
Once again, the Court emphasized the intertwinement of education and
democracy, but this time the Court followed Burger's Papish dissent and character-
ized democracy in more republican terms. "The role and purpose of the American
public school system were well described by two historians," the Bethel Court
explained, citing and quoting Charles and Mary Beard's New Basic History of the
United States, first published in 1944.62 "[Plublic education must prepare pupils for
citizenship in the Republic.... It must inculcate the habits and manners of civility
as values in themselves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to the practice
of self-government in the community and the nation." 63 The Bethel Court lifted this
quotation from a section of the Beards' New Basic History discussing the
development of democracy during the Jacksonian age of the nineteenth century.
Given the era being discussed, the Beards conceptualized education in republican
democratic terms. Worried about the combination of widespread male suffrage and
heavy immigration, Jacksonian-era "philosophers of educational progress [believed]
public education must prepare pupils for citizenship in the Republic," wrote the
Beards.' 4 After emphasizing the educational inculcation of "the habits and manners
of civility as values.., indispensable to the practice of self-government," the Beards
58 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
" Id. at 680.
60 Id. at 685.
6 Id. at 686 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. County Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,526
(1969) (Black, J., dissenting)).
62 Id. at681.
63 Id. (quoting CHARLES A. BEARD ET AL., THE BEARDS' NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 228 (1968)).
4 BEARD ET AL., supra note 63, at 228.
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quoted Horace Mann, the "indefatigable leader in the public-school movement,"
who stated that the purpose of education "is to preserve the good and to repudiate
the evil which now exists. 65 Mann, the Beards concluded, intended to "bring
wisdom, knowledge, and virtue to bear upon the improvements of the conditions of
the people."66
The Bethel Court's emphasis on civility and values contrasted sharply with the
Tinker-Healy-Papish insistence that we must tolerate pugnacious, offensive, and
even indecent expression within the constant give-and-take of the pluralist
democratic arena. Instead, the Bethel Court stressed that the "fundamental values
of 'habits and manners of civility' essential to a democratic society must ... take
into account consideration of the sensibilities of others. '67 Given this more re-
publican democratic depiction of American government, the Bethel Court reasoned
that "[t]he inculcation of these values is truly the 'work of the schools.' '"68
Consequently, the Court concluded: "The First Amendment does not prevent the
school officials from determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech such as
respondent's would undermine the school's basic educational mission. 69
In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, decided in 1988, the Court upheld
a high school principal's decision to delete articles discussing divorce and teen
pregnancy from a school-sponsored newspaper. 70 Although Justice Byron White
began the majority opinion by acknowledging Tinker, he then stressed the Bethel
retreat: "[T]he First Amendment rights of students in the public schools 'are not
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings. '7 Thus, under
Bethel, "[a] school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its
'basic educational mission." 72 Even so, the Hazelwood Court further chipped away
at students' free expression rights by creating an explicit exception to the Tinker
(and thus, presumably, the Bethel) doctrine. The Tinker (Bethel) doctrine applies
when school officials seek to restrict "a student's personal expression that happens
65 Id.
6 Id. These passages were identical in the 1944 and 1968 editions. Compare id., with
CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, A BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 237-38
(1944). Charles and Mary Beard were renowned progressive historians who matured during
the early twentieth century (during the heyday of progressive politics). Generally accepting
republican democracy, progressives advocated for interpretations of the common good
consistent with empirical realities rather than intuitions or a priori categories.
67 Bethel, 478 U.S. at 681.
68 Id. at 683 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. County Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508
(1969)). This quotation from Tinker is misleading. Although the Tinker Court used the
phrase, "work of the schools," it certainly did not suggest that the inculcation of particular
values of civility was the "work of the schools." Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
69 Bethel, 478 U.S. at 685.
70 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
71 Id. at 266 (quoting Bethel, 478 U.S. at 682).
72 Id. (quoting Bethel, 478 U.S. at 685).
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to occur on the school premises,"73 but it does not apply to school-sponsored
activities that "may fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum.
74
In the latter instance, free expression rights turn on whether the school created
a designated (or limited) public forum. Government property can be divided into
three categories: public forums, non-public forums, and designated public forums.75
A public forum, including the streets and parks, is government-owned property that
has traditionally been held open for public speaking. 76 All other government-owned
property is a non-public forum, unless the government has specially designated the
property for public speaking, in which case the property is transformed into a
designated or limited public forum.77 "[S]chool facilities may be deemed to be
[limited] public forums," the Hazelwood Court explained, "only if school authorities
have 'by policy or by practice' opened those facilities 'for indiscriminate use by the
general public,' or by some segment of the public, such as student organizations. 78
The Court concluded that the school-sponsored newspaper was not a public forum
and that school officials were, therefore, empowered "to regulate the contents of [the
paper] in any reasonable manner. '79 Thus, while Hazelwood created a large
71 Id. at 27 1.
71 Id. The Hazelwood Court wrote:
The question whether the First Amendment requires a school to tolerate
particular student speech-the question that we addressed in Tinker-is
different from the question whether the First Amendment requires a
school affirmatively to promote particular student speech. The former
question addresses educators' ability to silence a student's personal
expression that happens to occur on the school premises. The latter
question concerns educators' authority over school-sponsored
publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that
students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive
to bear the imprimatur of the school. These activities may fairly be
characterized as part of the school curriculum, whether or not they
occur in a traditional classroom setting, so long as they are supervised
by faculty members and designed to impart particular knowledge or
skills to student participants and audiences.
Id. at 270-71; see J. Marc Abrams & S. Mark Goodman, End of an Era? The Decline of
Student Press Rights in the Wake of Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 1988 DUKE
L.J. 706 (criticizing Hazelwood for eviscerating Tinker); Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do
Leave Their First Amendment Rights at the Schoolhouse Gates: What's Left of Tinker?, 48
DRAKE L. REv. 527 (2000) (arguing that the Court's recent cases follow Black's Tinker
dissent more than the Tinker majority).
" Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).
76 Id. at 45.
77 Id. at 45-46.
78 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267 (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 47) (citation omitted).
9 Id. at 270. Presumably, at the time that the Court decided Hazelwood, the Court would
have applied a strict scrutiny test if it concluded that the government had designated a limited
public forum. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
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exception to Tinker-Bethel, the Hazelwood doctrinal approach harmonized closely
with Bethel by showing great deference to school officials. At least when the school
has not created a designated public forum, "educators do not offend the First
Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student
speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. 8 ° Unsurprisingly, then, the
Hazelwood Court emphasized that school officials could censor student publications
to promote the values of civility and even to avoid political controversy.8 '
A school must .. .retain the authority to refuse to sponsor
student speech that might reasonably be perceived to advocate
drug or alcohol use, irresponsible sex, or conduct otherwise
inconsistent with "the shared values of a civilized social order,"
or to associate the school with any position other than neutrality
on matters of political controversy.
82
C. Free Expression and Education: Atypical Cases
In the transition from Tinker-Healy-Papish to Bethel-Hazelwood, the Court has
moved from a highly speech-protective approach generally consistent with pluralist
democracy to a less protective approach more characteristic of republican
democracy. 83 But why? After all, the Court still typically adheres to the strictures
of pluralist democracy in free expression as well as other cases. Why, in the context
of education, has the Court adopted a more republican democratic approach that
accords less protection to student speech and writing? Three factors might
contribute to this phenomenon: first, the nature of education; second, the nature of
pluralist democracy; and third, the politics of judicial decisionmaking.
First, the disputed nature of education in American society today might provoke
the Justices to conceive of free expression in educational institutions in a narrower
and more republican democratic fashion. Professional educators and theorists of
education disagree wildly about the purposes of education and have done so for
decades.8 Some educators, conceiving of their roles in republican democratic terms,
80 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272-73.
81 Id. at 272.
82 Id. (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)) (citation
omitted).
83 It is worth noting that the Hazelwood Court expressly reserved the question of whether
its doctrinal approach would apply to higher education. "We need not now decide whether
the same degree of deference is appropriate with respect to school-sponsored expressive
activities at the college and university level." Id. at 274 n.7.
'4 See JOHN D. PULLIAM, HISTORY OF EDUCATION IN AMERICA 161-92 (5th ed. 1991)
(describing competing philosophies of education); WILLIAM E. SEGALL & ANNA V. WILSON,
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emphasize the inculcation of certain substantive values that supposedly provide a
foundation for our nation. As the former Secretary of Education, William J.
Bennett, explained, "We must care about our public schools; and we must care about
the values taught in them. ' 85 Children must be educated to be good citizens, and
citizens are judged by "their character, their virtue, and their interest in the common
good. 8 6  But other educators shy away from such commitments to teaching
particular substantive values. Instead, these educators recognize a plurality, and
sometimes even a relativity, of values that political theorists have often invoked to
defend and justify pluralist democracy itself.8 7 From this standpoint, if schools
should avoid cultivating specific moral values-because there are a variety of
competing and equally worthy values-then schools should focus on teaching
individuals the skills needed to function in a diverse democratic society.88
INTRODUCTION TO EDUCATION: TEACHING IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 143-46, 152-59 (1998)
(describing competing educational theories that ascribe different purposes to schools and
curriculums). In 1979, Robert D. Kamenshine observed:
There is much current debate over the proper role of public education
in a democratic society. For some, a major purpose of public schools
is to produce graduates who share a fundamental commitment to "our
way of life." Others oppose this thinking and emphasize the need to
produce graduates capable of independently and critically assessing
American society.
Robert D. Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67
CAL. L. REV. 1104, 1133 (1979) (citations omitted).
85 WILIAM J. BENNETT, OUR CHILDREN AND OUR COUNTRY 71 (1988).
86 Id. at 10; see Stanley Ingber, Liberty and Authority: Two Facets of the Inculcation of
Virtue, 69 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 421 (1995) (arguing for a civic republican conception of free
expression in public schools). "Many states have statutes that require indoctrination in
'patriotism' and 'Americanism' or specify that the curriculum shall emphasize the virtues
of the 'free enterprise system.' Other laws specify that the curriculum shall portray the evil
of Communism or shall not present Communism favorably." Kamenshine, supra note 84, at
1135 (citation omitted).
87 Unsurprisingly, Bennett condemns "moral relativism." BENNETT, supra note 85, at 71.
For a theoretical presentation of pluralist democracy, see ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY
AND ITS CRITICS (1989).
88 See Kamenshine, supra note 84, at 1134 (criticizing educators and other scholars who
assume "the existence of 'correct,' or at least uniformly acceptable, political values").
Because of value pluralism or relativism, Kamenshine argues, religious and other non-
governmental organizations are better situated than public schools to teach values. "[I1n view
of the lack of general consensus about important values, means such as these which provide
a choice among ideological orientations are more consistent with free speech concerns." Id.
In 1994, the United States Department of Education articulated this goal: "Every adult
American will be literate and will possess the knowledge and skills necessary to compete in
a global economy and exercise the rights and responsibilities of citizenship." 1 EDUCATION
SOURCEBOOK 10 (Jeanne Gough ed., 1997).
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In light of such disagreements among theorists and scholars of education,
Supreme Court Justices themselves predictably also have disagreed about the
purposes of education. Some Justices have conceived of education from the vantage
of republican democracy, while others have conceived of education more
consistently with pluralist democracy. Because republican democracy historically
justified greater governmental incursions on liberty of expression, while pluralist
democracy historically catapulted free expression to the status of a constitutional
lodestar, the Justices have associated lesser or greater protections for student speech
and writing with their respective conceptions of education--either as republican or
pluralist democratic. A republican democratic concept of education would intertwine
with a narrower definition of free expression. A pluralist democratic concept of edu-
cation would intertwine with a broader free expression.
Second, while pluralist democracy revolves around the processes that assure
full and fair participation in the democratic arena, it does not preclude all
discussion and recognition of cultural values. The foremost theorist of pluralist
democracy, Robert Dahl, readily acknowledges that pluralist democracy rests on
a foundation of (democratic) cultural values.8 9 American culture, according to
Dahl, nurtures a consensus regarding democratic processes that allows individuals
and interest groups to clash in political struggles without tearing society asunder.'
A people who are accustomed to pursuing their self-interest with the greatest
vigilance must still be willing to compromise.9 "In practice ... the democratic
process isn't likely to be preserved for very long unless the people of a country
preponderantly believe that it's desirable and unless their belief comes to be
embedded in their habits, practices, and culture." 92 Given this relevance of cultural
values to pluralist democracy, one should not be surprised to find even a staunch
pluralist democratic court occasionally referring to the importance of values,
especially in the context of education. And such discussions of values might
gradually slide into the terms of republican democratic virtue, or vice versa,
discussions of republican democratic virtue might slip into references to pluralist
democratic culture. Indeed, in the midst of the Bethel Court's discourse on the
"fundamental values of 'habits and manners of civility'" 93-unmistakably
republican democratic in tone-the Court nonetheless included as a value,
"tolerance of divergent political and religious views," which resonates strongly
with pluralist democracy. 94 My point here is that the wall separating republican
democracy from pluralist democracy is, to a degree, permeable. Aspects of
89 ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 34-36, 150-51 (1956).
90 Id. at 145-46.
91 Id. at 34-36.
92 Id. at 172.
93 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986).
94 id.
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republican democracy bleed into aspects of pluralist democracy.95 In light of the
ambiguous nature of education, one should not be surprised to find that the late-
twentieth and early twenty-first century Court, firmly entrenched in the pluralist
democratic era, might nonetheless lapse into invocations of republican democratic
values when focusing on free expression in educational institutions.
Third, legal interpretation and, hence, Supreme Court decisionmaking, are
inherently political: Justices generally interpret legal texts to correspond with their
political preferences. 6 Thus, perhaps tautologically, politically conservative Justices
are more likely to interpret the First Amendment and free expression in accord with
political conservatism, while politically liberal Justices are more likely to interpret
the First Amendment in accord with political liberalism. Significantly, then, recent
debates about the nature of education often split along the traditional political lines
of conservatism and liberalism. Conservative educators tend to stress the incul-
cation of values historically consonant with republican democracy, while liberal
educators tend to emphasize the acceptance of multiple values and the compromise
of diverse interests within the political processes of pluralist democracy.97
Consequently, in the context of First Amendment disputes in public education,
conservative Justices' interpretations of free expression are likely to resonate with
republican democracy, while liberal Justices' interpretations are likely to resonate
with pluralist democracy.
The significance of politics to Supreme Court adjudication is highlighted if one
compares Bethel and Hazelwood with Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors of the
University of Virginia.98 Rosenberger arose when the University of Virginia funded
a variety of student organizations but refused to fund a student-created and student-
run periodical because of its overtly religious message. 99 The periodical's self-
proclaimed mission was "to challenge Christians to live, in word and deed,
according to the faith they proclaim and to encourage students to consider what a
personal relationship with Jesus Christ means."'" The periodical, in other words,
9' For example, both forms of democracy emphasize the sovereignty of people. Feldman,
supra note 11, at 433,439.
96 See Stephen M. Feldman, The Rule of Law or the Rule of Politics? Harmonizing the
Internal and External Views of Supreme Court Decision Making, 30 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 89
(2005). I am not suggesting that Supreme Court decisionmaking is purely or primarily
political. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993) (examining Supreme Court decisions in light of the Justices'
attitudes and values). Rather, that Justices sincerely interpret legal texts and that those sincere
interpretations accord with the Justices' political inclinations.
97 See LoUANN A. BiERLEIN, CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES IN EDUCATIONAL POLICY 4 (1993)
(contrasting conservative and liberal views of education).
98 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
99 Id.
1"0 Id. at 826 (citation omitted).
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was dedicated to evangelical "proselytizing," as Justice David Souter emphasized
in dissent.'0 ' Given this mission, the University worried that funding the periodical
would violate Establishment Clause principles (or values). 2 Yet, the Court not
only held that funding would not violate the Establishment Clause, but that the
denial of funding violated the students' free expression rights. 3
In a majority opinion written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Rosenberger
Court reasoned that the University's funding program for student organizations
created a limited public forum."' 4 In other scenarios, the Court had reasoned that
when the government designates a limited public forum, then the government "is
bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional public forum," like the streets
or parks.0 5 The government, then, cannot impose a content-based restriction on
expression unless it can satisfy the strict scrutiny test by showing that the restriction
is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.'" 6 In Rosen-
berger, however, even though the Court found that the University had created a
limited public forum, the Court applied a less rigorous degree of scrutiny. 7 "The
State may not exclude speech where its distinction is not 'reasonable in light of the
purpose served by the forum,' nor may it discriminate against speech on the basis
of its viewpoint."' 0 8 Typically, in the past, the Court had applied this reasonableness
and viewpoint-neutrality test to cases involving a non-public forum. In fact, in
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, another case
involving religious expression in public schools decided only two years before
Rosenberger, the Court assumed that the school had not created a limited public
forum and applied this same test.' °9 A school ban on religious expression, the
Lamb's Chapel Court reasoned, "could survive First Amendment challenge only if
excluding this category of speech was reasonable and viewpoint neutral."" 0 Putting
"o' Id. at 874-75 (Souter, J., dissenting).
102 Id. at 837 (majority opinion).
103 Id.
"04 Id. at 840.
"'i Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
6 ld. at 45; see, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-70 (1981) (applying strict
scrutiny to a limited public forum). 'The State may also enforce regulations of the time,
place, and manner of expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a
significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communi-
cation." Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
107 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.
1I8 Id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806
(1985)) (citation omitted).
109 508 U.S. 384, 392-93 (1993).
"o Id. at 393. The Court elaborated: "[C]ontrol over access to a nonpublic forum can be
based on subject matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable
in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral." Id. at 392-93 (quoting
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806). Cornelius involved a non-public forum. In Lamb's Chapel, the
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Rosenberger and Lamb's Chapel together, one would apparently (and confusingly)
apply the same test-requiring governmental reasonableness and proscribing
viewpoint discrimination-regardless of whether or not a school designated a
limited public forum. If so, why distinguish limited public forums from non-public
forums in the first place? Regardless, the Rosenberger Court followed the Lamb's
Chapel Court by imbuing this reasonableness and viewpoint-neutrality test with
pointed bite."' Specifically, the Rosenberger Court concluded that, in the facts of
that case, the University's funding of numerous secular organizations but denial of
funding to a religious periodical constituted viewpoint discrimination, contravening
the First Amendment." 2
The Court, it seems, has tangled itself in a bramble of doctrinal thistles with its
varied invocations of the public forum doctrine in Rosenberger and Lamb's Chapel
as well as in Hazelwood."3 Despite the doctrinal ambiguities, however, the Court's
degree of deference in Bethel and Hazelwood, varied markedly from that in
Rosenberger (and for that matter, Lamb's Chapel). Bethel and Hazelwood adopted
highly deferential standards that would allow school officials to restrict student
expression based on the content of the speech and writing. And then, in applying these
standards, the Justices emphasized that they needed to respect how school officials'
interpreted and applied their institutions' educational missions and pedagogical
Court reasoned that it need not decide whether the school district had created a limited public
forum, which the Court suggested would have triggered strict scrutiny, because the district
could not even satisfy the reasonableness and viewpoint-neutrality test applied to a non-
public forum. Id. at 390-97.
.' Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830 (emphasizing the decision to follow Lamb's Chapel).
112 Id. at 831. Lamb's Chapel held that a school district violated free speech when it
opened school property for public uses but denied access to a church that sought to use the
property for religious purposes. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 384. Subsequent to
Rosenberger, the Court decided Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98
(2001), which held that a public school violated the free-expression rights of a Christian
organization when the school refused to allow the organization to hold on school property
club meetings for children, ages six to twelve. The Court in Good News Club followed the
Rosenberger doctrine requiring reasonableness and viewpoint neutrality for a limited public
forum and again applied it with bite. Id. at 107-12; see also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.
263 (1981) (holding that a university violated free expression by refusing to allow a student
religious group to use school facilities ordinarily open to student organizations).
" In 1981, when the Court first invoked the public forum doctrine to resolve a free
expression case involving religious expression in an educational context, some of the justices
questioned whether the public forum analysis was appropriate. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277-79
(Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that public forum analysis was inappropriate); id. at
287-88 (White, J., dissenting) (doubting whether public forum analysis was useful); see also
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1138 (3d ed. 2006)
(criticizing the Court's confusion of doctrine in the limited public forum context).
Furthermore, Chief Justice Roberts has complained: "The mode of analysis employed in
Fraser [Bethel] is not entirely clear." Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2626 (2007).
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approaches. But in Rosenberger, the Court refused to defer to the University officials'
decision to deny funding to a religious periodical. While the Rosenberger doctrinal
standard appeared on its surface to be deferential-requiring the government merely
to act reasonably and neutrally-the Court added serious bite to this standard in
application. The Rosenberger Court, for instance, did not conclude that the Univer-
sity officials could promote anti-establishment principles or values as a reasonable
goal or as a legitimate pedagogical concern-even though the Establishment Clause
is part of the Constitution. Perhaps more important, the Court did not conclude that
the University's denial of funding was permissible content-neutral discrimination.
Given the facts, this conclusion would have been reasonable: the University policy
was to deny funding to religious organizations and activities in general, regardless
of sectarian viewpoint. The University, that is, did not discriminate specifically
against Christian evangelical organizations.
I do not, however, intend to argue that the Court decided Rosenberger
incorrectly, whether based on doctrine or otherwise.1 4 Instead, my point is that one
fruitful way to understand the results in Bethel, Hazelwood, and Rosenberger lies
in the Justices' political inclinations. A conservative bloc of Justices in Bethel and
Hazelwood allowed school officials to discriminate against student expression when
the content was allegedly lewd or controversial (discussing divorce and teen
14 While I disagree with the Rosenberger holding, cf., STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, PLEASE
DON'T WISH ME A MERRY CHRISTMAS: A CRITICAL HISTORY OF THE SEPARATION OF
CHURCH AND STATE 275-76 (1997) (criticizing the Rosenberger Court's concept of
neutrality), I acknowledge that there are reasonable doctrinal arguments in support of the
Court's conclusion. For example, one could counterargue that the University's denial of
funding was content-based discrimination because the University distinguished religious
activities from secular ones. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393-94 (noting that the lower
court categorized the governmental action as "viewpoint neutral"). Recognizing this
possibility, the University argued that the Establishment Clause compelled this
discrimination, to the extent that it was content-based.
Judge Frank Easterbrook suggests that the result in Hazelwood can be reconciled with
the result in Rosenberger because of the public forum doctrine. Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d
731, 734-35 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1169 (2006). In Hazelwood,
the school had not created a public forum, so the Court justifiably deferred to the school
officials, while in Rosenberger, the University had created a limited public forum, so the
Court justifiably refused to defer. While Judge Easterbrook's argument is reasonable, it has
certain problems. First, Judge Easterbrook ignores how the Supreme Court has confounded
the standards to be applied in limited public forum and non-public forum cases. Second,
Judge Easterbrook disregards the degree to which the Justices appeared to follow their
political inclinations both in deciding whether the government had created limited public
forums and in applying the respective free expression standards for limited public forums and
non-public forums (particularly in light of the fact that both the Hazelwood and Rosenberger
Courts, despite reaching different conclusions regarding the existence of a limited public
forum, both claimed to apply reasonableness standards).
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pregnancy). "5 Then a conservative bloc of Justices in Rosenberger refused to allow
school officials to discriminate against student expression that had an overtly
religious (Christian) content (or viewpoint)." 6 Thus, in Bethel and Hazelwood, the
Court interpreted the First Amendment to allow school officials to discriminate,
while in Rosenberger, the Court interpreted the First Amendment to preclude
discrimination. But in all the cases, the Justices interpreted and applied (ambiguous)
doctrine in a politically conservative fashion. Politically conservative Justices
reached conservative results: the Court protected Christian religious speech but not
more controversial or challenging expression.
II. MORSE V. FREDERICK AS A CASE STUDY
The Court's recent decision, Morse v. Frederick, illustrates how the Justices'
interpretations of free expression rights in educational institutions oscillate between
the two democracies.' 7 A high school principal, Deborah Morse, decided to allow
students to watch the Olympic Torch Relay as it passed by her school in Juneau,
Alaska. "8 As the torchbearers and accompanying camera crews passed the school,
a student, Joseph Frederick, "unfurled a 14-foot banner bearing the phrase: 'BONG
HiTS 4 JESUS. '""'" Morse confiscated the banner and suspended Frederick.' 20 A
five-Justice majority, with an opinion written by Chief Justice John C. Roberts, held
that this punishment did not violate Frederick's free expression rights.'
12
The Justices disagreed strongly about the meaning of "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS."
While dissenting Justice John P. Stevens deemed it "a nonsense message."' 22
Roberts wrote:
115 The only liberal Justice to join the majority opinion in either Bethel or Hazelwood was
John P. Stevens, who joined Justice White's opinion in Hazelwood but dissented in Bethel.
Moreover, the categorization of Justice Stevens as a liberal is disputable. He was appointed
by a Republican President (Gerald Ford), and his voting record across a variety of cases
might lead one to categorize Justice Stevens as a "centrist" with a "reputation for
independence and moderation." THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT 836
(Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1992).
.16 As the Rosenberger Court admitted, viewpoint discrimination is a "subset" or "form
of content discrimination." Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829-31.
"1 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
"1 Id. at 2622.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 2622-23.
121 Justice Stephen Breyer concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part. He did
not reach the First Amendment issue but reasoned that the principal was nonetheless shielded
by qualified immunity. Id. at 2638 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
122 Id. at 2649 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2008] 1017
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
The message on Frederick's banner is cryptic. It is no doubt
offensive to some, perhaps amusing to others. To still others, it
probably means nothing at all. Frederick himself claimed that
the words were just nonsense meant to attract television cam-
eras." But Principal Morse thought the banner would be
interpreted by those viewing it as promoting illegal drug use,
and that interpretation is plainly a reasonable one.'
Moreover, the Justices' various opinions in the case implicitly disagreed about
whether students' free expression rights should be conceptualized in accord with
republican or pluralist democracy. Roberts's opinion waffled between republican
democratic and pluralist democratic concepts of free expression in the public
schools, though Roberts ultimately leaned toward a more conservative and repub-
lican democratic interpretation of the First Amendment. Justice Clarence Thomas's
concurrence strongly favored a republican democratic approach, while Justice
Stevens's dissent and Justice Samuel Alito's concurrence both resonated with
pluralist democracy.
Justice Roberts reviewed the precedents running from Tinker through Hazelwood.
Even while Justice Roberts recognized that the Court has modified the Tinker
doctrine, he suggested that Tinker is still a vital decision. Justice Roberts character-
ized the black armbands in Tinker, worn to protest the Vietnam War, as "political
speech," which is "at the core of what the First Amendment is designed to protect." 24
Justice Roberts thus alluded to the so-called self-governance theory, which justifies
a strong reading of the First Amendment. Significantly, the judicial and scholarly
emphasis on self-governance arose only after the rise of pluralist democracy in the
1930s. 25 Free expression became a constitutional lodestar because, in part, political
participation cannot be fair and open for all citizens-a prerequisite for pluralist
democracy-unless each individual can freely express his or her interests in the
democratic arena. Free expression, in other words, became an integral component
of the pluralist democratic processes. Unsurprisingly, then, Justice Roberts refused
to adopt a rule, more consonant with republican democracy, that would allow school
officials to restrict expression because it was offensive or unpleasant.1
26
Yet, Justice Roberts did not merely follow Tinker. To the contrary, he discerned
two principles embodied in its progeny-two principles that reflect a serious
weakening of the Tinker precedent. First, students' free expression rights are less
than the full rights enjoyed by individuals outside a school context, and second,
Tinker no longer provided the doctrinal rule for determining the scope of students'
23 Id. at 2624 (majority opinion) (citation omitted).
124 Id. at 2626 (quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003)).
125 Feldman, supra note 11, at 454-55.
126 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2629.
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free expression rights.127 Predictably, then, Justice Roberts wrote approvingly of
parts of Bethel and Hazelwood that resonated strongly with republican democracy.
Justice Roberts quoted from the Bethel Court's judgment that a school district could
punish a student's "offensively lewd and indecent speech" 28 and from the Hazelwood
Court's ruling that school officials can control the "content of student speech in
school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related
to legitimate pedagogical concerns."' 2 9 And ultimately, Justice Roberts reached the
conservative conclusion-Frederick's expression was constitutionally unpro-
tected-by deferring to the principal's interpretation of the banner as promoting
illegal drug use.'30 Following this interpretation, Justice Roberts reasoned that the
danger in Morse "is far more serious and palpable" than in Tinker:'3' "The particular
concern to prevent student drug abuse at issue here, embodied in established school
policy, extends well beyond an abstract desire to avoid controversy.'
132
Justice Thomas's concurrence is less equivocal in its preference for a republican
democratic concept of free expression in the public schools. Justice Thomas argued
to overrule Tinker because it was not grounded "in the history of education."1 33
According to Justice Thomas, "the history of public education suggests that the First
Amendment, as originally understood, does not protect student speech in public
schools."'' 34 In fact, Justice Thomas's depictions of nineteenth-century public school
education and free expression under republican democracy, which held sway from
the framing through the 1920s, are persuasive. As Justice Thomas emphasized, the
purpose of the mid-nineteenth-century common schools was to inculcate children
with the values necessary to become virtuous citizens who would pursue the
republican democratic common good. "[E]arly public schools were not places for
freewheeling debates or exploration of competing ideas," Thomas wrote. "Rather,
teachers instilled 'a core of common values' in students and taught them self-
control." 135 Parents bore the duty to train their children to become "virtuous
members of society," and with that duty, parents necessarily had the power to
discipline, "to command obedience."'' 36 Acting in loco parentis, schools shared the
same duty and power, a power that would therefore allow schools to regulate student
speech. Justice Thomas concluded by quoting from an 1859 state court opinion: a
127 Id. at 2626-27.
.2 Id. at 2626 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986)).
129 Id. at 2627 (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988)).
130 Id. at 2629.
131 Id.
132 Id. (citation omitted).
133 Id. at 2635 (Thomas, J., concurring).
134 Id. at 2630.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 2631 (quoting State v. Pendergrass, 19 N.C. 365, 365-66 (1837)).
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teacher's power to punish student expression was "essential to the preservation of
order, decency, decorum and good government in schools."137 From Justice Thomas's
republican democratic perspective, then, the principal, Morse, could punish the
student, Frederick, for any expression that Morse deemed unvirtuous, including the
banner proclaiming "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS."' 38
Of course, despite Justice Thomas's insistence on following a stultifying
originalist interpretation of the Constitution, the nation is no longer a republican
democracy. It is a pluralist democracy, and it has been for seven decades. In light
of the transition to pluralist democracy, one must question whether the Court should
still construe students' free expression rights as if we lived in 1845. Justice Alito
refused to do so but nonetheless concurred. He strongly endorsed the Tinker
doctrine, which protects student expression unless it "threatens a concrete and
'substantial disruption."'" 39 Given that Tinker resonates strongly with pluralist
democracy, Justice Alito was understandably wary of allowing school officials "to
censor any student speech that interferes with a school's 'educational mission,"' a
doctrinal approach that seemingly would be more consonant with Bethel than
Tinker.'4° The "educational mission" approach, resonating with republican
democracy, would afford school officials broad discretion to inculcate their
preferred values or "political and social views."'41  This position, Justice Alito
declared, "strikes at the very heart of the First Amendment."'' 42 Why, then, did
Justice Alito concur instead of dissent? While the Healy Court had interpreted
Tinker to harmonize with the Brandenburg doctrine, protecting expression unless
it creates an imminent risk of proscribed conduct, Justice Alito argued that in "the
school environment, school officials must have greater authority to intervene before
speech leads to violence."'' 43 From Justice Alito's vantage, "Tinker's 'substantial
disruption' standard permits school officials to step in before actual violence
erupts."'" Justice Alito agreed with Justice Roberts that Frederick's banner should
be interpreted as "advocating illegal drug use," which poses "a grave and in many
13 Id. at 2632 (quoting Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114, 121 (1859)).
131 Justice Thomas mentioned the treatment of students at colleges, id. at 2631 n.2, but
then expressly stated that his "discussion is limited to elementary and secondary education."
Id. at 2631 n.3.
119 Id. at 2637 (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 514 (1969)). Justice Alito acknowledged, however, that Tinker "does not set out
the only ground on which in-school student speech may be regulated by state actors in a way




'43 Id. at 2638.
'44 Id. (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508-09).
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ways unique threat to the physical safety of students." '45  Thus, Justice Alito
concluded, Morse could punish Frederick pursuant to the Tinker doctrine.
Like Justice Alito, the dissenting Justice Stevens emphasized the Tinker
doctrine, but Stevens interpreted Tinker more consistently with Brandenburg.
"[U]nder Tinker, 'regulation of student speech is generally permissible only when
the speech would substantially disrupt or interfere with the work of the school or the
rights of other students. . . . Tinker requires a specific and significant fear of
disruption, not just some remote apprehension of disturbance.""'t46 The majority's
approach, Stevens protested, allowed Morse to discipline Frederick "because she
disagreed with the pro-drug viewpoint she ascribed to the message on the banner."'
4 7
But Justice Stevens argued that students, in accord with pluralist democracy, ought
to be able to express their diverse political views without fear of punishment.'48 The
Court's holding "strikes at 'the heart of the First Amendment' because it upholds a
punishment meted out on the basis of a listener's disagreement with her understand-
ing (or, more likely, misunderstanding) of the speaker's viewpoint."' 49 Specifically,
"the Court's ham-handed, categorical approach is deaf to the constitutional
imperative to permit unfettered debate, even among high school students, about the
wisdom of the war on drugs or of legalizing marijuana for medicinal use.' 150 Not
only must school officials allow students to voice their sundry political positions,
but officials should be precluded from enforcing values previously associated with
republican democratic virtue and civility. "If there is a bedrock principle underlying
the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of
an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."''
Thus, like the Tinker Court, Justice Stevens concluded that we must "risk" the
"hazardous freedom" of the First Amendment because it is crucial in our "relatively
permissive, often disputatious, society."'51
2
145 Id.
"4 Id. at 2645 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240
F.3d 200, 211 (3d Cir. 2001)) (emphasis omitted). Stevens wrote: "[T]he First Amendment
protects student speech if the message itself neither violates a permissible rule nor expressly
advocates conduct that is illegal and harmful to students." Id. at 2644.
147 Id. at 2645.
148 id.
149 Id.
ISo Id. at 2649. Stevens noted: "The Court's opinion ignores the fact that the legalization
of marijuana is an issue of considerable public concern in Alaska." Id. at 2649 n.8.
"'1 Id. at 2645 (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)).
152 Id. at 2651 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508-09
(1969)). Justice Stevens added that, even if the Court were to apply a less rigorous
interpretation of the First Amendment, Frederick's expression was too ambiguous to be
categorized as advocacy and, therefore, too ambiguous to punish. Id. at 2646. Finally,
Justice Stevens noted that if there were any doubt about whether the expression was
unprotected, the Court should find it within the compass of the First Amendment. He quoted
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CONCLUSION
For decades, the Court generally has decided free expression cases in
accordance with pluralist democracy. But the Justices' competing opinions in
Morse epitomize the unique nature of free expression in educational institutions.
Sometimes, the Justices delineate students' free expression rights consistently with
pluralist democracy, but other times, for a variety of reasons, the Justices retreat
toward republican democratic principles that usually help justify narrower
conceptions of students' First Amendment rights. Morse, of course, involved a high
school rather than a college or university. In future cases, the Court could reason
that one set of doctrinal rules should apply to primary and secondary schools while
a second set of rules should apply to institutions of higher education. Yet in the
past, the Court has not relied on this possible distinction, though the Justices have
acknowledged it.'53 The Court has apparently developed its doctrine without
.. r...... c......si....dei t .ioLbu e d UISiratUI among different levels of education.
Tinker arose in a high school (and junior high), but Healy and Papish arose in
colleges, and finally, Bethel and Hazelwood were back in high schools. Lower
courts have disagreed about the degree to which Hazelwood should control in the
college context, though they generally accept that, at a minimum, the Hazelwood
distinction between public forums, designated public forums, and non-public forums
is crucial to the free expression analysis When the courts have concluded that a
college has not created a designated public forum, then the courts tend to follow
closely the Hazelwood exception to Tinker. That is, school officials can restrict
student expression in school-sponsored activities, such as the publication of a
newspaper, so long as the officials' restrictions "are reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns.' ' 55 Indeed, the Supreme Court's confusing public forum
Roberts from another case: "[W]hen the 'First Amendment is implicated, the tie goes to the
speaker."' Id. at 2649 (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct.
2652, 2669 (2007)).
1' Id. at 2631 n.3 (Thomas, J., concurring); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S.
260, 273-74 n.7 (1988).
"5 Jeff Sklar, Note, The Presses Won't Stop Just Yet: Shaping Student Speech Rights in
the Wake of Hazelwood's Application to Colleges, 80 S. CAL. L. REv. 641, 657-62 (2007)
(discussing lower court cases). The dissenters in Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir.
2005) (en banc), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1169 (2006), argued that the Supreme Court
precedents suggest that elementary and secondary education should be distinguished from
higher education. Id. at 739-42 (Evans, J., dissenting).
115 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272-73; see Hosty, 412 F.3d at 734-38 (majority opinion)
(applying Hazelwood at college level); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1284-93
(10th Cir. 2004) (same); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1074-77 (1 th Cir. 1991) (same),
cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1218 (1992).
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cases suggest that even if the school has created a limited public forum, courts
should still apply a test requiring the government to act reasonably and neutrally.
Significantly, then, the en banc Seventh Circuit, with an opinion by Judge Frank
Easterbrook, has argued that the determination of what constitutes a reasonable
regulation might vary with the age of the students. 56
156 Hosty, 412 F.3d at 734-35. The court decided that, based on the summary judgment
record, it could not resolve whether the expression was protected, but that the university dean
was nonetheless protected by qualified immunity. Id. at 738-39; see Sklar, supra note 154,
at 665-69 (discussing Hosty).
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